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About
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Visit
People
Management
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Administration
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Research
Research Groups
Courses
Seminars
Join Us
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Qiuzhen College, Tsinghua University
Yau Mathematical Sciences Center, Tsinghua University (YMSC)
Tsinghua Sanya International  Mathematics Forum (TSIMF)
Shanghai Institute for Mathematics and  Interdisciplinary Sciences (SIMIS)
Hetao Institute of Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Sciences
BIMSA > BIMSA Digital Economy Lab Seminar Antitrust-regulated two-period pricing in community group-buying with heterogeneous group leaders: A game-theoretic analysis and welfare evaluation
Antitrust-regulated two-period pricing in community group-buying with heterogeneous group leaders: A game-theoretic analysis and welfare evaluation
Organizers
Ruize Gao , Liyan Han , Zhen Li , Fei Long , Dongbo Shi , Ke Tang , Li Wan , Qi Zhang
Speaker
Meiyi Wang
Time
Friday, March 13, 2026 3:00 PM - 4:00 PM
Venue
A3-2-303
Online
Zoom 435 529 7909 (BIMSA)
Abstract
This paper develops a multi-period dynamic game model to examine the optimal pricing and expansion strategies of community group-buying platforms under regulatory constraints. Platforms must balance leader incentives against merchant fees when making strategic choices across different competitive landscapes, with leaders’ product promotion ability serving as a critical determinant of equilibrium outcomes. The findings reveal that platforms’ willingness to subsidize leaders varies by competitive context: under monopoly or competition with traditional retailers, subsidies are triggered when leader ability reaches a threshold; however, under duopoly competition, subsidies become ineffective and abandoning them emerges as the dominant strategy. Enhanced leader ability drives profit growth and shifts optimal strategies from steady to rapid expansion. Yet, if leaders prioritize product promotion while neglecting community operations, consumer welfare may deteriorate. The results demonstrate that accurately evaluating leader ability and dynamically adjusting subsidy and fee mechanisms constitute the institutional foundation for orderly platform expansion in digital economies. Regulators should implement differentiated policies based on competitive structures to prevent subsidy failures and welfare losses in oligopolistic markets, dynamically balancing platform efficiency with coordinated improvements in social welfare.
Speaker Intro
Meiyi Wang is a PhD student at BIMSA and UCAS.Her research interests focus on digital economy, international finance, and AI-driven driving technologies.
Beijing Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Applications
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