北京雁栖湖应用数学研究院 北京雁栖湖应用数学研究院

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清华大学 "求真书院"
清华大学丘成桐数学科学中心
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上海数学与交叉学科研究院
河套数学与交叉学科研究院
BIMSA > BIMSA Digital Economy Lab Seminar Antitrust-regulated two-period pricing in community group-buying with heterogeneous group leaders: A game-theoretic analysis and welfare evaluation
Antitrust-regulated two-period pricing in community group-buying with heterogeneous group leaders: A game-theoretic analysis and welfare evaluation
组织者
高瑞泽 , 韩立岩 , 李振 , 龙飞 , 史冬波 , 汤珂 , 万莉 , 张琦
演讲者
王美懿
时间
2026年03月13日 15:00 至 16:00
地点
A3-2-303
线上
Zoom 435 529 7909 (BIMSA)
摘要
This paper develops a multi-period dynamic game model to examine the optimal pricing and expansion strategies of community group-buying platforms under regulatory constraints. Platforms must balance leader incentives against merchant fees when making strategic choices across different competitive landscapes, with leaders’ product promotion ability serving as a critical determinant of equilibrium outcomes. The findings reveal that platforms’ willingness to subsidize leaders varies by competitive context: under monopoly or competition with traditional retailers, subsidies are triggered when leader ability reaches a threshold; however, under duopoly competition, subsidies become ineffective and abandoning them emerges as the dominant strategy. Enhanced leader ability drives profit growth and shifts optimal strategies from steady to rapid expansion. Yet, if leaders prioritize product promotion while neglecting community operations, consumer welfare may deteriorate. The results demonstrate that accurately evaluating leader ability and dynamically adjusting subsidy and fee mechanisms constitute the institutional foundation for orderly platform expansion in digital economies. Regulators should implement differentiated policies based on competitive structures to prevent subsidy failures and welfare losses in oligopolistic markets, dynamically balancing platform efficiency with coordinated improvements in social welfare.
演讲者介绍
Meiyi Wang is a PhD student at BIMSA and UCAS.Her research interests focus on digital economy, international finance, and AI-driven driving technologies.
北京雁栖湖应用数学研究院
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