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About
President
Governance
Partner Institutions
Visit
People
Management
Faculty
Postdocs
Visiting Scholars
Administration
Academic Support
Research
Research Groups
Courses
Seminars
Join Us
Faculty
Postdocs
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Forum
Life @ BIMSA
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News
News
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Qiuzhen College, Tsinghua University
Yau Mathematical Sciences Center, Tsinghua University (YMSC)
Tsinghua Sanya International  Mathematics Forum (TSIMF)
Shanghai Institute for Mathematics and  Interdisciplinary Sciences (SIMIS)
BIMSA > BIMSA Digital Economy Lab Seminar Opinion dynamics game in conservation discourse
Opinion dynamics game in conservation discourse
Organizers
Ruize Gao , Liyan Han , Zhen Li , Fei Long , Dongbo Shi , Ke Tang , Qi Zhang
Speaker
Artem Sedakov
Time
Tuesday, November 4, 2025 10:00 AM - 11:00 AM
Venue
A7-301
Online
Zoom 388 528 9728 (BIMSA)
Abstract
Understanding the dynamics of opinion formation in conservation discourse is critical for reconciling conflicting economic and ecological priorities, as competing narratives directly shape policy effectiveness. Contemporary conservation discourse reflects a spectrum of strategic engagements between corporations and environmental organizations, ranging from adversarial positioning to collaborative partnerships. These relationships directly affect how opinions are formed and evolve within the professional conservation community, thereby influencing conservation discourse itself. This study examines these dynamics through an integrated analytical framework, combining game-theoretic approaches with opinion dynamics models to examine three interaction scenarios between corporations and environmental organizations: direct conflict, value-aligned compromise, and partial compromise with divergent value systems. We derive both Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal (Nash bargaining) solutions to characterize strategic outcomes under each scenario. The analysis utilizes publicly available data on professional collaboration networks and sociological survey findings, offering a comprehensive empirical foundation. In the direct conflict scenario, entities exhibit increased strategic polarization, striving to steer the discourse in their favor. In the compromise scenarios, the prevailing initial opinion within the professional community plays a significant role in shaping the actions of the entities, which align their strategies with public perspectives. Our results also show that environmental organizations tend to dominate conservation discourse due to the community's preference for conservation-oriented values, while corporations face challenges in mobilizing supporters.
Speaker Intro
Artem Sedakov,圣彼得堡国立大学数学博弈与统计决策系教授,博弈论中心主任。他的主要研究领域为动态博弈及其应用、合作博弈、社 会网络建模与控制等 。其研究成果发表于 European Journal of Operational Research、Dynamic Games and Applications等重要学术期刊。主持科研项目包括俄罗斯科学基金项目、俄罗斯基础研究基金项目等,于 2016 年荣获中国科学院杰出青年访问学者奖。学术兼职包括 Game Theory and Applications 特刊和 International Game Theory Review 客座编辑,以及 Annals of Operations Research、European Journal of Operational Research 等多个学术期刊的审稿人。
Beijing Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Applications
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